Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Charles Chihara and G.H. von Wright

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32 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara]
In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara]
Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara]
The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]
A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro]
We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara]